Ad options are a recent development in online advertising which provide advertisers with greater flexibility related to buying their guaranteed deliveries in the future. In short, an ad option is a contract in which an online publisher (or search engine) grants an advertiser the right but not obligation to enter into transactions to purchase impressions or clicks from a specific online ad slot at a pre-specified price on a specific delivery date. Previous studies on the ad option pricing models are mostly restricted to the situation where the underlying price follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM). However, it has been shown that GBM only happens in less than 20% of the stochastic movements of ad auction prices. In this paper, we address this issue by employing a stochastic volatility (SV) model to describe the evolution of the underlying price which does not rely on the assumption of GBM. The computational tractability is solved by approximating the SV model with a proposed censored binomial lattice. Our developments are validated by experiments with the real advertising data. We find that the SV model has a better fitness to the real adverting data; with the real data, we demonstrate that advertisers are able flexibly to manage their guaranteed deliveries by using the proposed options. We also demonstrate that publishers will have increased revenue when some of their inventories are sold via ad options.
Introduction
Options, as a concept, have been introduced recently into online advertising to solve the non-guaranteed delivery problem as well as provide advertisers with greater flexibility. Moon and Kwon (2010) focused on an option for sellers to make a flexible choice between two pricing schemes, namely, cost-per-mille (CPM) or cost-per-click (CPC), whereas Wang and Chen (2012) and Chen et al. (2014a) proposed ad options between buying and nonbuying the future impressions. In practice, the latter has been implemented as a "First Look" tactic that is widely offered by publishers who offer prioritised access to selected advertisers within an open real-time bidding (RTB) market environment (Yuan et al., 2013) . Instead of the winning impression going to the highest bid in RTB, "First Look" affords first the right of refusal for an impression within an exchange based on a pre-negotiated floor or fixed price. If the buyer requests it, they are guaranteed to win the impression. This privilege is typically granted in return for a commitment (IAB, 2013) . Formally, an ad option is a contract in which an advertiser can have a right but not obligation to purchase future impressions or clicks from a specific ad slot or keyword at a pre-specified price. The pre-negotiated price is usually called the strike price in finance. In display advertising, the price can be charged as either a CPM or CPC depending on the underlying ad format. The corresponding winning payment price of impressions or clicks from real-time auctions is called the underlying price. The publisher or search engine grants this right in exchange for a certain amount of upfront fee, called the option price. The option is more flexible than guaranteed contracts as on the delivery date, if the advertiser thinks that the spot market is more beneficial, he can join online auctions as a bidder and his cost of not using an ad option is only the option price.
When valuating ad options, the previous research (Wang and Chen, 2012; Chen et al., 2014a) is mostly restricted in their usage to those situations where the underlying price follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) (Samuelson, 1965 ) (see Section 2 for more details). According to Yuan et al. (2013) , Yuan et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2014b) , there is only a very small number of ad slots or keywords whose CPM or CPC satisfies the GBM assumption. Therefore, the previous studies fail to provide an effective unified framework that covers general situations.
In this paper, we address the issue and provide a more general pricing framework. Our option pricing framework is based on lattice methods and uses the stochastic volatility (SV) model to describe the underlying price movement for cases where the GBM assumption is not valid. Based on the SV model, we construct a censored binomial lattice for option pricing. Lattice methods can also be used for pricing display ad options with the GBM underling. In this paper, we examine several binomial and trinomial lattice methods to price a display ad option and deduce the close-form solutions to examine their convergence performance. Our developments are validated by experiments using real advertising data. We examine the fitness of the underlying model, and illustrate that the options provide a more flexible way of selling and buying ads. In particular, we show that an advertiser can have better deliveries in a bull market, where the underlying price increases. On the other hand, a publisher or search engine is able to reduce the revenue volatility over time. In a bear market, where the underlying price decreases, there is a growth in total revenue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 introduces the preliminaries of lattice methods for pricing an ad options with the GBM underlying. Section 4 discusses our lattice method for pricing an ad option with the SV underlying. Section 5 presents our experimental results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related Work
Options have been widely used in many fields: financial options are an important derivative when speculating profits as well as hedging risk (Wilmott, 2006) ; real options are an effective decision-making tool for evaluating business projects and corporate risk management (Boer, 2002) . The ad options discussed in this paper are closely connected to financial options, whose evaluation can be traced back to Bachelier (1900) , who proposed to use a continuous-time random walk as the underlying process to price an option written on a stock. Samuelson (1965) then replaced the Bachelier's assumption with a geometric form, called the geometric Brownian motion (GBM), thereby solving the problem of negative underlying price. Based on the GBM, Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) discussed a risk-neutral option pricing method independently, called the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model, opening the floodgates to option pricing. Various numerical procedures appear in this field, including lattice methods, finite difference methods, Monte Carlo simulations etc. These numerical procedures are capable of evaluating more complex options when the close-form solution does not exist. In our discussion, we focus on lattice methods with parametric underlying processes. Sharpe (1978) initiated the concept of pricing a call option written on an asset with simple up and down two-state price changes. We call this the one-step binomial lattice method and use it as a pedagogical framework to explain the continuous-time option pricing model without reference to stochastic calculus. Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) then developed a multi-step binomial framework, called the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) model, which can converge with the BSM model if the length of the time step is sufficiently small. Boyle (1986) proposed a trinomial lattice, whereby the asset price can either move upwards, downwards, or stay unchanged in a given time period. Other contributors to one factor lattice methods include Kamrad and Ritchken (1991) , Tian (1993) and Haahtela (2010) . The main results of these methods are presented in Table 1 , where the movement scale is the ratio of the price in the next state to the current one, and the transition probability is the risk-neutral probability that the asset price moves from the current state to the next one, which is labeled from the upper state to the lower state. It is worth noting that all of these methods adopt Samuelson's GBM assumption for the underlying asset price.
However, the GBM assumption may not always be valid empirically. This motivates a general Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) diffusion process for option pricing. Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990) discussed the conditions under which a sequence of binomial processes converges weakly to an OU diffusion process and investigated its application to pricing an option written on an asset with constant volatility. Primbsa, Rathinamb, and Yamadac (2007) then proposed a pentanomial lattice method that incorporates the skewness and kurtosis of the underlying asset price and found that the limiting distribution is compounded Poisson. Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990) and Primbsa, Rathinamb, and Yamadac (2007) only solved the lattice pricing for the non-GBM underlyings which have constant volatility. Florescu and Viens (2008) proposed a lattice method that deals with SV underlyings. However, their method is not very practical in terms of computational efficiency as the transition Table 1 . Summary of the relevant lattice methods for pricing a call option with the GBM underlying. Detailed descriptions of notations are given in Table 2 .
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Note: CRR (Cox et al., 1979) ; Tian-BIN and Tian-TRIN (Tian, 1993) ; Haahtela-BIN (Haahtela, 2010) ; Boyle-TRIN (Boyle, 1988) ; KR-TRIN (Kamrad and Ritchken, 1991). probabilities are restricted by many conditions and need to be estimated independently before building up the price lattice (see Section 4 for more details). From our point of view, a direct censor on transition probabilities of each node, as Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990) , would be more efficient. Our proposed method in Section 4 is based on this idea. Note that the lattice methods that are based on non-parametric processes are not discussed here as they are less relevant to our focus.
Several recent papers have examined ad options (Moon and Kwon, 2010; Wang and Chen, 2012; Chen et al., 2014a) . We now briefly indicate the differences between our work and the previous research. To our best knowledge, the concept of ad options was initially proposed by Moon and Kwon (2010) . Their ad option was designed to guarantee advertisers the right to choose the minimum payment between CPM and CPC after clickthrough rate (CTR) is realized. This design is similar to an option paying the worst and cash (Zhang, 1998) because the strike price is not constant and the option payoff depends on the minimum price of the two underlying assets. Their option price is determined by the negotiation between advertiser and publisher under the framework of a Nash bargaining game. Buy and sell utilities are both considered and are constrained by two negotiation powers, so the objective of option pricing is to maximize the product of these two utilities.
Our study differs from Moon and Kwon (2010) in contract design, option pricing objective and framework of modeling randomness. Specifically, first, as described, the option buyer in our settings can choose to be charged by either CPM or CPC. The strike price should be fixed when signing the contract but not after realizing CTR. Second, our pricing objective is no arbitrage rather than achieving a game equilibrium from supply and demand sides. Third, we model the underlying price evolution based on a binomial or trinomial lattice; however, there is no explicit discussion in Moon and Kwon (2010) about modeling the underlying randomness. Wang and Chen (2012) discussed a simple ad option based on the one-step binomial lattice method. However, there is no hybrid match of strike and underlying prices: an advertiser can only choose to pay a fixed CPC for a click or a fixed CPM for an impression. Moreover, their ad option is priced from the perspective of a publisher but not a risk-neutral advertiser. Simply, the publisher considers minimizing the revenue risk incurred due to price movement. By selling a proper ratio of future impressions or clicks via ad options, he can bring the rising and falling revenues to the same level. Therefore, no matter at what transition probability the price rises or falls, the expected revenue in the next step deviates least from the current revenue level obtained from auctions alone. This method differs slightly from the classical pricing methods and ours. However, we simply prove the equivalence of their method and ours in the one-step binomial lattice framework (see A for details). Chen, Wang, Cox, and Kankanhalli (2014a) investigated a special option for sponsored search whereby an advertiser can target a set of keywords for a certain number of total clicks in the future. Each candidate keyword can be specified with a strike price and the option buyer can exercise the option multiple times at any time prior to or on the contract expiration date. This design is significantly different to our option structure. In addition, they priced the option by using Monte Carlo simulations based on a multivariate GBM but still fail to discuss the situations when the GBM assumption is not valid.
Preliminaries
This section introduces the basic settings of the lattice based option pricing framework in the context of display advertising. We examine the previous lattice methods based on the GBM assumption (see Table 1 ) and provide a comparative analysis of their convergence performance to a closed-form pricing formula (see D). For the reader's convenience, the key notations used throughout the paper are described in Table 2 . It is worth mentioning that we here discuss the case where an ad option allows its buyer to pay a fixed CPC for display impressions. Therefore, the strike price of the option is the fixed CPC and the underlying price is the uncertain winning payment CPM from RTB, where each single impression being auctioned off is paid at the second highest bid (Google, 2011; Yuan et al., 2013) . Other ad option cases can be discussed in the same manner. For example, the case where an ad option allows its buyer to pay a fixed CPM for display impressions, or the case where an ad option allows its buyer to pay a fixed CPM or CPC for clicks.
Suppose that an advertiser buys a display ad option in time 0 which allows him to purchase several impressions from a publisher's ad slot in time 1 at a fixed CPC, denoted by F C . As impressions are normally auctioned off at a CPM value, the underlying price is the winning payment CPM from RTB, denoted by M i , i = 0, 1. In time 1, the underlying price may rise or fall, denoted by M Risk-neutral state transition probability, labeled from the top node to the bottom node.
Risk-neutral probability on each node, i = 1, . . . , k + 1. Q Risk-neutral probability measure. P Real-world probability measure.
Option payoff on the expiration date (i.e., the time step n).
Option price at time 0 (i.e., the time step 0).
Normal distribution with mean x and standard deviation y, where x ∈ R, y ∈ R. µ Constant drift for the underlying price.
σ, σ(t)
Constant, stochastic volatility the underlying price. κ, θ, δ Constant speed, long-term mean, and volatility for the stochastic volatility model.
M {u}
1 /(1000H) ≥ F C , the advertiser will exercise the option; if M {u} 1 /(1000H) < F C , he will not exercise the option but join RTB instead. Note that H represents a constant CTR; therefore, the underlying and strike prices can be compared on the same measurement basis. Mathematically, we use the option payoff function Φ 
We follow a general economic settings and consider that the advertiser is risk-neutral so that he exercises the ad option only if the option payoff is maximized (Wilmott, 2006) . We use the so-called risk-neutral probability measure for option pricing (Björk, 2009) . In finance, it is defined by the statement that the expected risky return of an asset is equal to a risk-less bank interest return. In the online advertising environment, the risk-neutral probability measure Q = (q, 1 − q) satisfies the following equation
where r = (1 + r) is the risk-less return over the period from time 0 to time 1, u = M {u} 1 /M 0 and d = M {d} 1 /M 0 are the movement scales of CPM. Therefore, we can obtain the riskneutral transition probability q = ( r − d)/(u − d). Note that here q equals to q 1 in Table 1 , which describes the probability that CPM moves upward in time 1. Since the option value can be considered as a bivariate function of time and underlying price, the option value at time 0 can be obtained by discounting the expected option value at time 1 under Q = (q, 1 − q) (Björk, 2009, see Martingale) . The option value at time 1 is actually the option payoff; therefore, the option price at time 0 can be obtained by discounting the expected
Lattice framework: (a) the binomial lattice for CPM; (b) the trinomial lattice for CPM. Detailed description of notations and terminology is given in Table 2 .
payoff, that is
This option price π 0 is fair because it rules out arbitrage (Varian, 1987; Björk, 2009) . Arbitrage means that an advertiser can obtain a profit larger or smaller than the risk-less bank interest rate with certainty. Consider if the option price is overestimated, i.e., π 0 > r −1 (qΦ
, the advertiser can sell short an ad option at time 0 and save the money into bank to get the risk-less profit rπ 0 − (qΦ
. Converse strategies can be used to obtain arbitrage if the option price is underestimated. Up to this point, we have discussed the option pricing framework that is the one-step binomial method, initially proposed by Sharpe (1978) . We find that Eq. (2) can also be derived from the perspective of a publisher who wants to hedge the revenue risk incurred from CPM changes (see A for more details).
For a multi-step binomial lattice, as shown in Figure 1(a) , the possible values of CPM and the corresponding risk-neutral transition probabilities can be estimated directly by investigating various combinations of each one-step model, so the option price π 0 can be obtained as follows
where q = q × (u/ r). If each time step ∆t = T/n is sufficiently small, a continuous-time closed-form formula for π 0 can be obtained (see B for more details), which is very similar to the BSM option pricing formula (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973) . Figure 1 (b) shows a trinomial lattice and there are 6 parameters: u, m, d are state movement scales; q 1 , q 2 , q 3 are the corresponding risk-neutral transition probabilities. These parameters uniquely determine the movement of CPM, which then determines a unique value of an ad option written on CPM. They must be restricted such that the constructed trinomial lattice converges to the log-normal distribution of CPM in continuous time (i.e., the GBM assumption). We use the moment matching technique (Cox et al., 1979) to define the basic restrictions as follows:
where 0 ≤ q 1 , q 2 , q 3 ≤ 1. Since there are 6 parameters, 3 additional equations are necessary to define a unique solution. Here we examine the additional conditions discussed by previous research (Boyle, 1988; Kamrad and Ritchken, 1991; Tian, 1993) and use the same settings to price a display ad option. For the sake of completeness, we present a simple algorithm (see C) that describes how to construct a trinomial lattice for the underlying price and then how to calculate the option value backward iteratively. In Figure 2 , we compare the convergence performance of binomial and trinomial lattice methods for option pricing. The BSM-like closed-form solution (see Eq. (34) in B) is used as the golden line to examine how quickly that the option price calculated based on a lattice can approximate to its closed-form value. Figure 2(a) illustrates the situation when the option value at time 0 is in the money (i.e., M 0 /(1000H) ≥ F C ) and Figure 2(b) shows the out of the money case (i.e., M 0 /(1000H) < F C ). Several findings are worth mentioning here. First, the convergence rate of the trinomial lattice is fast than that of the binomial lattice; however, more nodes need to be computed for the former, i.e., (n + 1) 2 nodes for the trinomial lattice while there are only (n + 1)(n + 2)/2 nodes for binomial lattice. Second, we find that the Tian-TRIN (Tian, 1993) model has a better convergence performance than the others. Table 2 .
Censored Binomial Lattice for the SV Underlying
When the GBM assumption is not valid empirically, the SV model can be used to describe the underlying price movement. Let us extend the case whereby an ad option allows its buyer to pay a fixed CPC for display impressions. The SV model for the uncertain winning payment CPM (i.e., M(t)) can be expressed as follows:
where µ is the constant drift of CPM, σ(t) is the volatility of CPM, W(t) and Z(t) are the standard Brownian motion under the real world probability measure P, and κ, θ, δ are the volatility parameters. The drift factor κ(θ − σ(t)) ensures the mean reversion of σ(t) towards its long-term value θ. The volatility factor δ σ(t) avoids the possibility of negative σ(t) for all positive values of κ and θ. Let X(t) = ln(M(t)), we then have the following risk-neutral form of Eq. (7) (see E.1 for more details):
where r is the constant continuous-time risk-less interest rate and W Q is a standard Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability measure Q. The process X(t) can be weakly Algorithm 1 Censored binomial lattice method for pricing a display ad option with the SV underlying. Detailed descriptions of notations are provided in Table 2 .
Step y; end if end for π 0 ← Eq. (21) (see Step z); end function approximated by a series of binomial processes, say X(t i ), i = 1, . . . , n. The approximation conditions are discussed by Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990) (see D for more details).
In Algorithm 1, we present our method of calculating the option price for a display ad option whose underlying is the SV model. Simply, we first construct a binomial lattice for X(t i ) which approximates X(t) weakly. The lattice is constructed from time step 0 to time step n, and at each time step, we calculate the nodes from top to bottom. In the following discussion, we explain the details of Steps x-z. Figure 3 illustrates the calculation from time step k to time step k + 1.
Step x We start the estimation from the first node X {1} (t k ) in Figure 3 , whose two successors can be expressed as follows
where J {1} (t k )σ(t k + ∆t) √ ∆t is the point on the grid closest to X {1} (t k ), given by
and σ(t k + ∆t) can be estimated by (see E.2)
Eqs. (10)- (11) verify the conditions that a binomial lattice can be used to approximate a general diffusion process (see Eqs. (37)-(39) in D). We can rewrite Eqs. (10)-(11) in terms of their conditional increments as follows: Figure 3 . Censored binomial lattice for the SV underlying. Detailed description of notations are provided in Table 2. where K {1} (t k ) is the grid adjusting parameter for the successors of the first node at time t k . As shown in Figure 3 , the value of K {i} (t k ), i = 1, 2, . . . , 2k − 1, can be either positive or negative, To satisfy the approximation condition in Eq. (36) (see D), we have
Therefore, the following two equations holds:
where q {1} 1 (t k ) and q {1} probability for the first node at time t k . By solving the above equations, we have
Eqs. (17) and (18) show that transition probabilities q {1} 1 (t k ) and q {1} 2 (t k ) are censored in the approximation.
Step y We then move to other nodes and construct their successors in the same manner. However, as some nodes in the next step are recombining, the following equations hold for 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
The transition probabilities for the node X {i+1} (t k ) can be given by
Step z We follow the calculation steps x-y for each time step until the contract expiration date, and finally obtain Q {i} (t n ) and X {i} (t n ), for all nodes (i = 1, . . . , n + 1) at time step n. Then the option price can be obtained as follows:
Similar to Algorithm 2, the option value can also be calculated recursively over the lattice.
In the above discussion, we follow Florescu and Viens (2008) to construct the binomial lattice and use variables K {i} (t k ) and J {i} (t k ) to tune the grid so that the constructed framework is recombining. In the meantime, it satisfies the approximation conditions proposed by Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990) . We make two significant improvements compared to Florescu and Viens (2008) . First, we improve the underlying dynamic of SV. Florescu and Viens (2008) considered a simple mean-reverting process (i.e., the Vasicek model (Vasicek, 1977) ) where the main disadvantage is that volatility can possibly become negative.
We here use a modified mean-reverting process (i.e., the Cox-Ingersoll-Rubinstein (CIR) model (Cox et al., 1985) ) where the volatility can always be non-negative. Second, we simplify the calculations of K {i} (t k ), J {i} (t k ) and Q {i} (t k ) for each node. Florescu and Viens (2008) used a two-step iteration method to estimate K {i} (t k ), J {i} (t k ) and Q {i} (t k ) for all nodes first. Their two-step iteration method is computationally complex as the distribution for the volatility process needs to be updated iteratively based on the initial distribution belief and the volatility values need to filtered to be non-negative. In our method, as the transition probabilities are censored directly at each node, K {i} (t k ), J {i} (t k ) and Q {i} (t k ) can be calculated sequentially from top to bottom alongside the lattice construction for the underlying price. Once the upper node is calculated, it can be used to update the value of its lower node. Therefore, the risk-neutral probability distribution Q {i} (t k ) for each node can be quickly computed as follows:
and Q(t 0 ) = 1. Figure 4 presents an empirical example of constructing a censored binomial lattice for pricing a display ad option written on an ad slot from a SSP in the UK. The given values of the model parameters are estimated from the training data. Figure 4 (a) shows a censored binomial lattice for the underlying CPM and Figure 4(b) illustrates how the option value is calculated backward iteratively from the expatriation data to time 0. For the sake of comparison, Figure 5 illustrates the binomial lattices constructed by the CRR model with the same parameter settings. Obviously, the changing volatility can be found in Figure 4 (a) while 5(a) exhibits a constant volatility over time. We find that the option price given by the SV model is slightly smaller than the CRR model. This is because the long-term mean value of volatility is 0.2959, smaller than its initial value 0.8723. Therefore, the drift drags the volatility downside to its long-term level and the option value based on the SV model contains less risk than the CRR model.
Empricial Evaluation
We present our experimental results in this section. We examine the GBM assumption with the real advertising data, compare the fitness of the underlying models, analyze if an advertiser can have better deliveries under a fixed daily budget, and discuss the effects on the publisher's (or search engine's) revenue.
Datasets and Experimental Design
The following two datasets are used in the experiments (see Table 3 ): a RTB dataset from a SSP in the UK; and a sponsored search dataset from Google AdWords. The RTB dataset contains all advertisers' bids and the corresponding winning payment CPMs (per transaction). The Google dataset is obtained by using Google's Traffic Estimation service (Yuan and Wang, 2012) , in which we remove 21 keywords that have over 30% missing values and also 115 keywords whose CPCs are all zero. Tables 4-5 illustrates our experimental settings. We divide each dataset into several experimental groups, each of which is specified with one training, one development and one test set. The model parameters are estimated in the training set. Display ad options are priced in the development set. The actual bids in the test set are used to examine the priced options. The default value of CTR in the experiments is set to 0.03.
Fitness of GBM and SV Models
The following two conditions hold if the GBM assumption is valid empirically (Marathe and Ryan, 2005) : (i) the normality of the logarithm ratios of the winning payment price 1 ; and (ii) the independence of the logarithm ratios from the previous data. Normality can be graphically checked by a histogram and Q-Q plot, and be statistically verified by the Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965) . To examine the independence, we use the autocorrelation function (ACF) (Tsay, 2005) and the Ljung-Box statistic (Ljung and Box, 1978) . If the winning payment price satisfies the GBM assumption, we evaluate the ad option by using the Tian-TRIN model (or the BSM-like closed-form formula). If the GBM assumption is not valid empirically, we develop a SV model and price the ad option by using the censored binomial lattice method. Figure 6 presents an empirical example of testing the GBM assumption for an ad slot from the SSP dataset, where the underlying winning CPM cannot be described accurately as a GBM. In fact, none of the 31 ad slots in the SSP dataset satisfy the GBM model. Therefore, we use the SV model for the ad slots in the SSP dataset. Figure 7 presents an example of a keyword from the Google dataset. The keyword's winning CPC satisfies the GBM assumption. The log-normality of CPC is validated in Figure 7 (a)-(c) and the independence is confirmed by Figure 7(d) . The overview results of the Google dataset is shown in Figure 8 . There are 14.25% and 17.20% of the keywords in the US and UK markets respectively that can be accurately described by the GBM model. We will price the remaining keywords using the SV model. Number of steps
Price (CPC)
Underlying price GBM SV Actual data (f) Figure 9 . Empirical example of comparing the fitness of GBM and SV models to the keyword "kinect for xbox 360" from the Google AdWords dataset. The training period is from time step 1 to 50, the development and test periods are from time step 51 to 150. Plot (a), (c), (e) illustrates three instances of simulated paths from the estimated GBM and SV, respectively. Plot (b), (d), (f) provides the corresponding smooth pattern and confidence interval of plot (a), (c), (e). 18 Table 6 . Comparing the model fitness for all 31 ad slots in the SSP dataset. L-2 distance is the Euclidean distance, and the number represents the percentage of ad slots which shows that the SV model has a better fitness (i.e., a smaller L-2 distance).
Training set (31 days) Development & test set (7 days Table 7 .
Comparing the model fitness for the non-GBM keywords in the Google AdWords dataset. L-2 distance is the Euclidean distance, and the number represents the percentage of non-GBM keywords which shows that the SV model has a better fitness (i.e., a smaller L-2 distance). 80.5556% Figure 9 gives an empirical example of the model fitness test for the situation where the GBM assumption is not valid. We give three different instances of simulated paths from the GBM and SV models for the same keyword. Figure 9(a) ,(c),(d) compares the simulations from these two models with the actual winning payment CPCs in real-time auctions. We also examine the smooth movement pattern of these three instances in Figure 9(b),(d),(f) . We find that the SV model has a better fitness to the data. In addition, we use the Euclidean distance (also called the L-2 distance) to examine the similarity of a simulated path and the test data. The overall results of the ad slots and keywords in our datasets are presented in Tables 6-7, showing that the SV model has a general better fitness to the real data.
Delivery Performance for Advertiser
In Tables 8-9 , we give an empirical example that compares an advertiser's delivery performance between RTB and ad options. Tables 8 shows the advertiser's delivery performance in RTB with a fixed daily budget. If the supplied impressions are at same levels and if the average winning payment CPMs increase, the advertiser will receive fewer impressions. In Table 9 , the advertiser buys several display ad options in advance. Consider if he purchases an ad option with expiration date 08/02/2013, he has the right to secure impressions that will be created on 08/02/2013 at a fixed CPC. Here we consider the advertiser uses the daily budget from the corresponding delivery date to pay the upfront option price. Therefore, as shown in Table 9 , the advertiser's advertising strategy is to purchase as many ad options in advance as possible, and the remaining daily budgets will be used on the corresponding delivery dates. We use the actual bids from RTB to simulate the real-time feeds of the spot market, so if the market value of a click is higher than the fixed payment, the advertiser will use ad options to secure the needed clicks and then pay the fixed CPCs accordingly. Otherwise, the advertiser will obtain the equivalent clicks from RTB. Our example shows a "bull market" where the average spot CPM in the test set is far higher than the initial CPM. Therefore, the bought ad options would be actively used by the advertiser to purchase the clicks. Compared to Table 8 , the advertiser can receive more clicks (increased by 20.92%) in a bull market via ad options.
The overall results are presented in Tables 10-11 . For the SSP dataset, we consider the ad options that allow advertisers to pay a fixed CPC to purchase impressions of targeted ad slots. For the Google dataset, we consider the ad options that allow advertisers to pay a fixed CPM to purchase clicks of their targeted keywords. To summarize, we find that an advertiser's daily budget can be used more effectively in a bull market and that his delivery increases as well. The advertiser's average cost spent on each impression or click is reduced. In a bear market (i.e., the underlying price decreases), the advertiser will use the ad options less (and sometimes not at all) and the maximum cost is just the option price. It is worth noting that here we consider the ad options are in the money at time 0 (i.e., the strike price is less than the current underlying price). In Table 8 , there are 4 ad slots that exhibit somewhat bear markets. However, these 4 ad slots do not receive enough bids in the test set and the actual winning payment CPMs are just around its floor reserve level (i.e., the CPM is £0.01 so the per impression price is £0.00001). Since these prices will seriously bias the results, we do not take them into account in the situation of a bear market. Table 8 . Empirical example of an advertiser's delivery of an ad slot from the SSP dataset in RTB (Note: CTR is 0.03 and the non-integer numbers are displayed at 4 digits after the decimal point while in computing we consider 25-digit scale). Table 9 . Empirical example of an advertiser's delivery of buying ad options for an advertisement slot in the SSP dataset (Note: CTR is 0.03 and the non-integer numbers are displayed at 4 digits after the decimal point while in computing we consider 25-digit scale). Table 10 . Overview of the improvement in delivery performance by using ad options for all ad slots in the SSP dataset.
Bull market Bear market Change on used budget (%) -8.7878% -Change on delivery of impressions (%) 6.1781% - 
Revenue Analysis for Publisher and Search Engine
We now examine the revenue for a publisher (or search engine). We consider the revenue effects when a certain amount of future impressions or clicks can be sold in advance. Figure 10 gives two empirical examples of ad slots from the SSP dataset: one exhibits the bull market while the other shows the bear market. The sell ratio in the figure represents the percentage of future impressions that are sold in advance via display ad options; therefore, when the sell ratio equals zero, the publisher auctions off all of the future impressions in RTB. Figure 10 (a) suggests that the publisher should sell less future impressions in advance if the future market is bull. This is because the ad options will be exercised by advertisers in the future and the obtained revenues from the fixed payment are less than these impressions' market values. Of course, the publisher can choose a certain percentage of future impressions to sell according to his level of risk tolerance or to meet other business objectives. For example, the publisher may be willing to sacrifice some revenues in order to increase the advertisers' engagement in the long run. Conversely, in a bear market, as shown in Figure 10 (b), the publisher is advised to sell more future impressions in advance because there is more upfront income if more display ad options are sold, and in the future advertisers will not exercise the sold options. Therefore, the increased revenue comes from the option price. Based on the above analysis, we examine the revenue effects across all ad slots and keywords in our datasets. In the experiments, the display ad options in a bull market are priced in the money while in a bear market they are priced out of the money. The sell ratio is set at 0.20 in a bull market while it is set at 0.80 in a bear market. The overall results are presented in Tables 12-13 , which further confirm our analysis in the empirical examples. The average revenue is reduced in the bull market as well as the standard deviation (i.e., one kind of revenue risk). However, as described, the publisher (or search engine) may be willing to sacrifice some revenue to establish a long-term relationship with advertisers. In a bear market, the average revenue increases significantly. This is because fewer display ad options are exercised. Many premium advertisers join RTB so that the market equilibrium is almost as same as that in an environment with only auctions. Finally, the publisher (or search engine) earns the upfront payment without providing guaranteed deliveries.
Conclusion
This paper describes a new ad option tailored to the unique environment of display advertising. We propose a lattice method to price an ad option whose underlying price does not follow a GBM. We also examine several lattice methods for an ad option with the GBM underlying. Our developments are examined and validated by experiments using real advertising data. For future research, we are interested in developing a lattice method that be used to price an ad option with the multivarite non-GBM underlying.
A Proof of Equivalence of the Option Price under the One-Step Binomial Lattice
We now derive the option pricing formula from the perspective of a publisher who wants to hedge the revenue risk incurred from price changes. We follow the work of Wang and Chen (2012) and prove that under the one-step binomial lattice the derived option price is similar to the one that we can calculate from the perspective of a risk-neutral advertiser. Here we consider the case where an ad option allows its buyer to pay a fixed CPC for display impressions. Therefore, the strike price of the option is the fixed CPC and the underlying price is the uncertain winning payment CPM in online auctions. We also assume that there is a deterministic total number of future impressions to sell, denoted by S M . If the CPM in time 1 goes up, the publisher's revenue can be expressed as
where α is the percentage of estimated total impressions to sell via ad options. Eq. (22) shows that the publisher's revenue is a combination of guaranteed and non-guaranteed impressions. Eq. (22) 
Therefore, we can obtain ψ(j * , n, q) = P(j ≥ j * , j ∈ {1, . . . , n}) = P j − nq nq(1 − q) ≥ j * − nq nq(1 − q)
where N (·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. 
Recall that the expectation of an Itô integral is zero, we obtain
where F(0) represents the information up to time 0. Therefore, the conditional stochastic volatility σ(t k + ∆t) can be obtained by the following formula σ(t k + ∆t) = σ(t 0 )e −κ(t k +∆t) + θ(1 − e −κ(t k +∆t) ).
E.3 Estimation of Parameters κ, θ, δ
Several statistical methods can be used to estimate the values of parameters κ, θ, δ. The simplest method is the ordinary least squares (OLS) method (Kladivko, 2007) . The discreteness form of Eq. (8) is
where (t k ) ∼ N(0, ∆t). We can rewrite the equation as follows
The sum of square errors ∑ n−1 k=1 δ (t k ) 2 can be minimized so that κ and θ can be obtained,
where n is the size of training data. Then, we have . (51) Then, we obtain the estimation of δ by the formula
Another method is the maximum likelihood (ML) method. Kladivko (2007) discussed the different implementations of the ML method in Matlab and compared the results to the OLS method for a specific dataset. In our experiments, we find that the calculated option prices of display ad options are less sensitive to OLS and ML methods; therefore, we adopt the OLS method as it is computationally simpler.
